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Critical Response 
I 
Two Laws: Response to Elizabeth Povinelli 
John Frow and Meaghan Morris 
Appearing at a time of backlash in Australia against the multicultural 
policies of the past twenty-five years and of retreat by the present conser- 
vative government from the complex issues raised by indigenous peoples 
using their citizenship to seek entitlements under the law, Elizabeth A. 
Povinelli's important article 'The State of Shame: Australian Multicultur- 
alism and the Crisis of Indigenous Citizenship' (Critical Inquiry 24 [Winter 
1998]: 575-610) provides a challenging critique of the conditions in 
which this retreat took shape. 
The value of Povinelli's essay in this context is that it catches neatly 
the unhappy paradox of difference theories posited as an alternative to 
the politics of identity: that they come to rely on the self-identity of the 
different. Her argument is that the Australian High Court's Mabo judge- 
ment (more precisely the complex of Mabo and Others v. The State of Queens- 
land (1992), the Native Title Act of 1993, and The Wik Peoples v. The State 
of Queensland (1996), proclaimed both by the court and by the Labor gov- 
ernment (1990-96) of Paul Keating as constituting a moment of restor- 
ation of rights and of national reconciliation, in fact returns meagre 
benefits to Aborigines and imposes a criterion of authenticity to which 
they must conform (in a 'performance [of cultural difference] before the 
law' [p. 591]) in order to receive entitlement. Recognising a performance 
of nonmodernity (see pp. 604-5), the law actively discourages any ambiv- 
alence about customary identities. 
For Povinelli this criterion marks the limits of multicultural policy. 
Her argument is not just the familiar one that multiculturalism fails to 
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recognise the radically different status of indigenous groups in a mixed 
settler society, thus reaffirming the centrality and superior citizenly status 
of, in particular, Anglo-Celtic settlers; rather, she demonstrates that such 
a multiculturalism cannot find a place for the complexity and the 'funda- 
mental alterity' (p. 581) of Aboriginal identity, never pure or singular but 
always diversely produced in and by interactions over time with the dis- 
possessing settler population. 
We are troubled, however, by the certainty with which Povinelli 
writes off that multicultural project, which, as she says, was 'a deeply opti- 
mistic liberal engagement with the democratic form under conditions of 
extreme torsion as social and cultural differences proliferate and as capi- 
tal formations change' (p. 583). There are two aspects of her critique that 
we find problematic. The first is the instrumentalism that she ascribes to 
multicultural policy. She puts the matter this way: What her essay investi- 
gates is 
how the state uses a multicultural imaginary to solve the problems 
that capital, (post)-colonialism, and human diasporas pose to na- 
tional identity in the late twentieth century... These state multicul- 
tural discourses, apparatuses, and imaginaries defuse struggles for 
liberation waged against the modern liberal state and recuperate 
these struggles as moments in which the future of the nation and its 
core institutions and values are ensured rather than shaken. [P. 579] 
The claim is thus not just that multiculturalism has less than perfect polit- 
ical effects (on this we do not disagree), but that it has in some sense been 
designed in such a way as to do so, with a specifiable political intent. 
Second, this instrumentalism is ascribed by Povinelli to the state, un- 
derstood as a singular, unified, and intelligent agent. The High Court of 
Australia (corresponding to the U.S. Supreme Court) is assumed to share 
an intentionality with the government, and they are jointly equated with 
'the state'; the phrase 'state law', odd and ambiguous within a common- 
law jurisdiction, carries these conflations throughout the article (p. 598). 
The constitutional separation of powers is thus treated as an epiphenom- 
enon of a more fundamental unity, and the High Court is criticised for 
not having effected apolitical break with the existing structure of property 
rights by giving recognition to Aboriginal customary law. More precisely, 
the High Court grants a 'recognition' which, in full bad faith, at once 
gives and refuses; Aboriginal law is accorded a place as the necessary con- 
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dition for Aboriginal identity and the recognition of native title rights, 
but it is rendered entirely without valence in the present, at once sub- 
sumed and abolished within the common law. It exists only for as long as 
it takes to sight it and then sinks back into the darkness of a superseded 
culture. 
But to make this criticism, and to accuse the High Court of having 
used 'the very tools that had legislated and institutionalized racial and 
cultural prejudice to free national institutions from that prejudice with- 
out performing an ideological critique of the institutions themselves' 
(p. 584), is surely to miss the point. The High Court is a judicial, not a 
political (let alone a 'critical') institution. It makes legal judgements in 
accordance with legal precedent; were it to act in a political manner (for 
example, by recognising Aboriginal sovereignty) it would lose a legitimacy 
that is already deeply contested. It has no grounds of action beyond the 
interpretation of existing law, and its decisions are constrained by the 
specificity of its genres of writing. Moreover, the criticism misses precisely 
the creative radicalism within its own terms of the court's break with the 
predominant doctrinal strand (that of terra nullius) within which the issue 
of indigenous property rights had in all previous Australian decisions 
been decided. The Mabo judgement was at the outer limit of what is pos- 
sible from a conservative judicial institution; to expect something dramat- 
ically different is to obviate the politics of the possible. 
Native title is a construct of the Australian legal system, and it de- 
pends precisely on the peculiar modality of recognition/nonrecognition 
that Povinelli rightly identifies as its aporetic condition of existence. It 
then has a secondary set of conditions of existence constructed in statu- 
tory law. The conditions constructed by the High Court in Mabo and sub- 
sequently in Wik gave potentially real, although limited, benefits to some 
groups of indigenous people; the Native Title Act, initially passed by the 
Keating government in 1993 and then substantially modified in 1998 by 
the Howard government, removed or constrained many of those benefits. 
The political effects of these different constructions cannot be conflated 
into a singular project of the state. In overturning the doctrine of terra 
nullius the Mabo decision conformed to a juridical rather than a political 
logic. It took both the advocates and the opponents of multiculturalism 
by surprise; if its effect was in no way to free Aboriginal Australians from 
their oppression, it was also not-either deliberately or in its own de- 
spite-'the resubordination of the Aboriginal society vis-a-vis European 
law and society' (p. 591). Rather, its effects were mixed, problematic, and 
unstable, and it is for this reason that it is wrong to subordinate its dy- 
namic to the aims and rhythms of the state or, for that matter, to those of 
capital. The law is not a simple instrument of other forces. 
In writing off Mabo as a manifestation of the will of the state Povi- 
nelli's argument does not allow for the reality either of the court's achieve- 
ment (partial as it is) or, more significantly, of ongoing political conflict 
between a plurality of complexly aligned parties. Her argument makes it 
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a matter of indifference that the present conservative government has 
effectively almost extinguished the small gains made, or potentially 
achievable, by some Aborigines, and that this action has been bitterly con- 
tested not only by the opposition Labor Party and minor Senate parties 
but by other 'organs of the state' (such as the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission, not to mention the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission), and by the peak Aboriginal organisations. 
In Povinelli's account, this politics can only figure as inconsequential, 
whereas-rightly or wrongly-it has assumed absolutely central symbolic 
importance within the Australian polity as a test of whether the national 
state has the capacity now to confront its racist past. No one believes Mabo 
in itself is or ever was a solution; large numbers of people, including Abo- 
rigines, consider its symbolic value to be of crucial political importance. 
Similarly, multiculturalism is a policy and not, as Povinelli suggests, a 
'claim' expressive of the will of 'the Australian state' (p. 581). Policies are 
the hybrid products of diverse political activities by many social agents; 
almost always (in Australia) compromise formations that satisfy no one 
for long, they are open to contestation, sudden abandonment, and un- 
predictable change. True, multiculturalism until recently provided what 
Povinelli calls 'national hegemonic projects' (p. 579)-we emphasise the 
plural-with a long-lasting and stable policy framework. But this was 
possible only because it had a bipartisan status. Given that status, how- 
ever, it was furiously criticised and, in practice, was varied from all sides 
(and by competing hegemonic 'projects') over time in the political pro- 
cesses of 'the state'. Not least in those organs of the Australian state called 
universities and schools, critiques not unlike Povinelli's were widely prop- 
agated and, especially in the last few years of multiculturalism's 'hege- 
mony', aired on state radio and television. If in 1996 this situation 
changed, it did so because a 'popular' right-wing revolt against cosmopol- 
itanism as well as against globalisation was able to use the processes of 
state effectively to demand and achieve a drastic shift in policy framework 
and thus of the national agenda. Multiculturalism is still a policy, but one 
unequivocally espoused now only by Labor and allied minor parties. 
Thus rendered oppositional, its outlines are blurred, rewritable, up for 
grabs; it has to be fought over again in a fundamental way, and the out- 
come of this struggle is unforeseeable-by 'the state' or anyone else. 
These matters have implications for the politics of difference every- 
where. If the state is understood (as it still so often is on the Left, perhaps 
especially within the libertarian traditions of the United States) as a mo- 
nolithic and repressive force, then no action by legislatures or courts to 
propound and enforce policies of recognition of cultural difference can 
be taken seriously; they are never more than the ruses of power. With this 
revelation installed as the conclusion that must always be reached, it is 
difficult to see how the mobility that Povinelli rightly requires of critical 
analyses can really be achieved (see p. 580); more than once she calls for 
analysis to show how subaltern and critical energies are defused, adjusted, 
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seduced, and recuperated by dominant forces, a formulation of the criti- 
cal imperative that allows only for motion towards the known, rather than 
for the mobility that political creativity requires (see pp. 579, 583). The 
upshot of this logic of the foregone conclusion is to strand critical think- 
ing and radical politics alike in a Platonic realm of appearances; behind 
the sound and fury of the world of 'normal' politics-legal challenges, 
policy processes, community lobbying, media wars, group negotiations, 
and mundane federal elections-loom the massive, unchanging forms of 
'the state', 'the law', and 'the market'. 
Most immediately, indigenous people are then forced into precisely 
that position of radical otherness (the requirement not to be complicit 
with the ruses of the state) in which Mabo's criterion of cultural authentic- 
ity-as Povinelli herself so subtly and persuasively shows-places them. 
This immobilising gesture, so much at odds with most of her analysis, 
is enacted in her essay by the figure of clitoridectomy-an odd figure 
to invoke repeatedly, since to the best of our knowledge (and that of 
the anthropologist friends we checked with) the practice does not occur 
amongst indigenous Australians. Its rhetorical function in the essay is to 
emblematise a kind of radical acceptance of cultural otherness. In the 
absence of a definite or appropriate cultural referent, however, its use in 
this context actually has the effect of conflating different others within a 
generalised figure of Otherness. 
For Povinelli, Australian multiculturalism is 'an especially interesting 
example of the role a multicultural discourse and fantasy play in cohering 
national identities and allegiances and in defusing and diverting libera- 
tion struggles in late modern liberal democracies' (pp. 580-81); the core 
paradox she identifies is that this apparent recognition of and respect 
for difference, this 'new collective self-understanding', works at the same 
time as a 'new technology of state power' that nevertheless has the ap- 
pearance (but no more than that) of being 'a means to liberate subalterns 
from the state' (p. 592). Together, 'the court and state construct native 
title as a legitimate part of state multiculturalism only to plough it into 
the ground of a new, transcendental, monocultural nation' (p. 579). The 
reality, we would argue, is that these 'liberation struggles' had and have 
few paths other than by way of these civic and legal machineries, which 
are not a diversion from some more authentic struggle but important 
enabling conditions of indigenous peoples' political advancement. The 
very word liberation can be misleading in its sense of movement out of a 
space of oppression; for the Belyuen in the Darwin hinterland, as for koori 
housing associations in Redfern, the crucial political questions have to 
do, as Povinelli herself shows, with control of the spaces that indigenous 
people inhabit.' 
1. Koori, meaning 'people', is the word by which many people of indigenous descent 
in southeastern Australia designate themselves as a collective. 
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